What is the significance of GDP per capita to a society? What does it represent conceptually? These questions have been addressed in past decades, engendering extensive explorations of the limitations of the indicator, yet answers have proved problematic or partial. The paper presents the main conclusions so far drawn and builds upon them to present a new reading of the significance of GDP per capita. At the heart of this reading is the view that, while GDP per capita is not (...) indicative of the welfare of individuals, it is indicative of an irreducible ‘group well-being.’ This view, however, requires one to relinquish the belief that only individuals can be ‘well.’ It turns out that the allegedly orthodox view, which sees GDP as a human-centered indicator, requires an unorthodox philosophical standpoint, one that accepts an irreducible group well-being. The paper presents this alternative interpretation and addresses its upsides and limitations. (shrink)

Social scientists have engaged extensively with the empirical findings of the Easterlin-paradox. However, any statement regarding the meaning and implications of the paradox are derived only through the mediation of normative assumptions. The paper renders these assumptions explicit (and, therefore, open for political discussion), a necessary step in legitimizing the Easterlin paradox as a compass for politics. Based on the analysis of the assumptions lurking behind the common implications of the paradox, the paper opens the door to alternative implications of (...) the paradox. Thus, it refers to other normative assumptions that combine together the assumptions discussed - and is therefore regarded as pluralist in essence - and singles out one particular strong variant - the ‘dual necessity’ variant. This strong assumption, invariably overlooked in the literature, is defined here and its significant political implications for the Easterlin paradox illustrated. (shrink)

This paper provides a real-world test case for how to approach contemporary preference aggregation procedures. We examine the method of using stated preferences to structure social well-being indices. The method has seen increasing popularity and interest, both in economists’ laboratory research and by governments and international institutions. SP offers a sophisticated aggregation of peoples’ preferences regarding social well-being aspects and, in this way, provides elegant and non-paternalistic techniques for deciding how to weigh and prioritize various potential aspects of social well-being. (...) However, this method also poses difficulties and limitations from broader political and philosophical perspectives. This paper comprehensively charts these difficulties and suggests that SP methods should be complemented with appropriate deliberation procedures. The paper bridges the distinct perspectives of economists and political theorists in order to make SP an attractive instrument in determining policy. (shrink)

Edgeworth's original mathematical formalization of utilitarianism as presented in his works of 1877–81 illustrates an intriguing phase in the mutually intertwined history of economics and utilitarianism. In this article I analyse Edgeworth's motivations and point to its interesting implications. In particular, it is pointed out that the starting point of Edgeworth's project had little to do with the field of economics, but formed part of an attempt to present utilitarianism in the most scientific way possible; an attempt made in the (...) context of intensive dispute between the three opposing camps in the field of ethics at the time. Nevertheless, the project concluded with the monograph Mathematical Psychics (1881) that embodied an original relationship between economics and utilitarianism. (shrink)

In the last several months, several major disciplines have started their initial reckoning with what ChatGPT and other Large Language Models (LLMs) mean for them – law, medicine, business among other professions. With a heavy dose of humility, given how fast the technology is moving and how uncertain its social implications are, this article attempts to give some early tentative thoughts on what ChatGPT might mean for bioethics. I will first argue that many bioethics issues raised by ChatGPT are similar (...) to those raised by current medical AI – built into devices, decision support tools, data analytics, etc. These include issues of data ownership, consent for data use, data representativeness and bias, and privacy. I describe how these familiar issues appear somewhat differently in the ChatGPT context, but much of the existing bioethical thinking on these issues provides a strong starting point. There are, however, a few “new-ish” issues I highlight – by new-ish I mean issues that while perhaps not truly new seem much more important for it than other forms of medical AI. These include issues about informed consent and the right to know we are dealing with an AI, the problem of medical deepfakes, the risk of oligopoly and inequitable access related to foundational models, environmental effects, and on the positive side opportunities for the democratization of knowledge and empowering patients. I also discuss how races towards dominance (between large companies and between the U.S. and geopolitical rivals like China) risk sidelining ethics. (shrink)

An examination of the controversial "theory of mind" hypothesis, which states that children with autism are unable to comprehend other people's mental states. The theory relates to the most fundamental questions of normal development as well as to autism i.

Libertarian paternalism's notion of “nudging” refers to steering individual decision making so as to make choosers better off without breaching their free choice. If successful, this may offer an ideal synthesis between the duty to respect patient autonomy and that of beneficence, which at times favors paternalistic influence. A growing body of literature attempts to assess the merits of nudging in health care. However, this literature deals almost exclusively with health policy, while the question of the potential benefit of nudging (...) for the practice of informed consent has escaped systematic analysis. This article focuses on this question. While it concedes that nudging could amount to improper exploitation of cognitive weaknesses, it defends the practice of nudging in a wide range of other conditions. The conclusion is that, when ethically legitimate, nudging offers an important new paradigm for informed consent, with a special potential to overcome the classical dilemma between paternalistic beneficence and respect for autonomy. (shrink)

Presents Newton's unifying idea of gravitation and explains how he converted physics from a science of explanation into a general mathematical system.

This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in (...) order to defend this reply against the objection that it is ad hoc. (shrink)

This book provides an analytical and critical appraisal of Rousseau's political thought that, while frank about its limits, also explains its enduring power.

The aim of this paper is to argue for some useful distinctions in the theory of grounding. I do so by first introducing the notion of grounding, discussing some of its features, and arguing that grounds must play some role in bringing about what they ground (sec.1). I then argue that there are various distinct roles a fact may play in bringing about another, and more particularly that we should distinguish between three such roles; enablers, partial grounds, and facts that (...) partly ground (sec. 2). Finally, I present two theoretical advantages to incorporating these distinctions into our theory of grounding. Namely, that it reframes, and arguably dissolves, the contingentist-necessitarian debate (sec. 3), and that it helps to elegantly deal with the purported counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding and thus maintain the plausible elements of the assumption that grounding is a transitive relation (sec.4). (shrink)

This book presents views of the concept of intention and its relationship to communication from three perspectives: philosphy, linguistics, and artificial intelligence. The book is a record of a workshop held in 1987.

This paper explores the truism that people think about what they say. It proposes that, to satisfy their own goals, people often plan their speech acts to affect their listeners' beliefs, goals, and emotional states. Such language use can be modelled by viewing speech acts as operators in a planning system, thus allowing both physical and speech acts to be integrated into plans. Methodological issues of how speech acts should be defined in a planbased theory are illustrated by defining operators (...) for requesting and informing. Plans containing those operators are presented and comparisons are drawn with Searle's formulation. The operators are shown to be inadequate since they cannot be composed to form questions (requests to inform) and multiparty requests (requests to request). By refining the operator definitions and by identifying some of the side effects of requesting, compositional adequacy is achieved.The solution leads to a metatheoretical principle for modelling speech acts as planning operators. (shrink)

The story of this book of 'materials on Ludwik Fleck' is also the story of the reception of Ludwik Fleck. In this volume, some essential materials which have been produced by that reception have been gathered together.

An important obstacle to lawhood in the special sciences is the worry that such laws would require metaphysically extravagant conspiracies among fundamental particles. How, short of conspiracy, is this possible? In this paper we'll review a number of strategies that allow for the projectibility of special science generalizations without positing outlandish conspiracies: non-Humean pluralism, classical MRL theories of laws, and Albert and Loewer's theory. After arguing that none of the above fully succeed, we consider the conspiracy problem through the lens (...) of our preferred view of laws, an elaboration of the MRL view that we call the Better Best System (BBS) theory. BBS offers a picture on which, although all events supervene on a fundamental level, there is no one unique locus of projectibility; rather there are a large number of loci corresponding to the different areas (ecology, economics, solid-state chemistry, etc.) in which there are simple and strong generalizations to be made. While we expect that some amount of conspiracy-fear-inducing special science projectibility is inevitable given BBS, we'll argue that this is unobjectionable. It follows from BBS that the laws of any particular special or fundamental science amount to a proper subset of the laws. From this vantage point, the existence of projectible special science generalizations not guaranteed by the fundamental laws is not an occasion for conspiracy fantasies, but a predictable fact of life in a complex world. (shrink)

Students of perception have long known that perceptual constancy is an important aspect of our perceptual interaction with the world. Here is a simple example of the phenomenon concerning color perception: there is some ordinary sense in which an unpainted ceramic coffee cup made from a uniform material looks a uniform color when it is viewed under uneven illumination, even though the light reflected by the shaded regions to our eyes is quite different from the light reflected by the unshaded (...) regions to our eyes (see figure 1). Or consider this example concerning size perception: there is some ordinary sense in which two telephone poles look the same size when the first is viewed from 100 meters and when the second is viewed from 1 meter, even though the visual angle subtended by the two poles on our retinae is very different (see figure 2). Or consider this example concerning shape perception: there is some ordinary sense in which a penny looks round both when viewed head on and when viewed from an acute angle, even though the area projected by the penny onto our retinae under these two conditions is very different (see figure 3). Or, finally, consider this example concerning auditory volume perception (which I cannot depict graphically): there is some ordinary sense in which a speaker’s voice sounds the same volume when heard from across the room and when heard from a distance of 1 meter, even though the energy striking our ears under these two conditions is very different. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper introduces the category of ‘non-deceptive manipulation that causes false beliefs’, analyzes how it narrows the traditional scope of ‘deception’, and draws moral implications.

The traditional view in epistemology is that we must distinguish between being rational and being right (that is also, by the way, the traditional view about practical rationality). In his paper in this volume, Williamson proposes an alternative view according to which only beliefs that amount to knowledge are rational (and, thus, no false belief is rational). It is healthy to challenge tradition, in philosophy as much as elsewhere. But, in this instance, we think that tradition has it right. In (...) this paper we defend our version of the traditional view and argue against Williamson’s alternative. (shrink)

A large body of evidence on the activity of regulatory T (Treg) cells was gathered during the last decade, and a similar number of reviews and opinion papers attempted to integrate the experimental findings. The abundant literature clearly delineates an exciting area of research but also underlines some major controversies. A linear cause–result interpretation of experimental maneuvers often ignores the fact that the activity of Treg cells is orchestrated with the effector T (Teff) cells within an intricate network of physiological (...) immune homeostasis. Every modulation of the activity of the effector (cytotoxic) immune system revolves to affect the activity of regulatory (suppressive) cells through elaborate feedback loops of negative and positive regulation. The lack of IL‐2 production by innate Treg cells makes this cytokine a prime coupler of the effector and suppressive mechanisms. Here we attempt to integrate evidence that delineates the involvement of IL‐2 in primary and secondary feedback loops that regulate the activity of suppressive cells within the elaborate network of physiological immune homeostasis.©2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc BioEssays 30:875–888, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This article focuses on ethical issues surrounding the selling and buying of human organs. The author argues that most people who sell their organs in India do so in order to pay already existing debts. The transaction is only temporarily an exchange of “life for life,” and most “donors” are back in debt soon after the operation. The author discusses the flexible ethics that reduce reality to dyadic transactions and the purgatorial ethics that collapse real and imaginary exploitation in the (...) service of complex interests. He also offers a sophisticated discussion of the ethics of publicity and public ethics. He emphasizes the lack of factual information, intentional manipulation of information, and the dissemination of kidney panics and kidney scandals, especially by the new developing bioauthorities and bioethical brokers. (shrink)

Maxmin Expected Utility was first axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler in an Anscombe–Aumann setup Anscombe and Aumann which includes exogenous probabilities. The model was later axiomatized in a purely subjective setup, where no exogenous probabilities are assumed. The purpose of this note is to show that in all these axiomatizations, the only assumptions that are needed are the basic ones that are used to extract a cardinal utility function, together with the two typical Maxmin assumptions, Uncertainty Aversion and Certainty Independence, (...) applied only to 0.5:0.5 mixtures. For the purely subjective characterizations, this means that assumptions involving an unbounded number of variables can be replaced with assumptions that involve only a finite number thereof. (shrink)

Character strengths are widely studied positive traits considered to be “values in action,” reflecting morally valued virtues. They are hypothesized to serve as pathways to the manifestation of values in life for the benefit of individuals and societies. However, there is surprisingly limited theoretical writing and empirical research on the expected links of character strengths with specific values [e.g., as defined by Schwartz ] or on character strengths as the pathway for behavioral and social manifestations of these values. In this (...) paper, we delineate theoretical links between the two theories and outline their implications. We then provide an initial empirical examination of a specific character strength – gratitude, as a pathway from Schwartz’s self-transcendence values to prosocial behavior and peer acceptance, in two samples of adolescents. The findings indicated that most pathways were significant, providing initial support for the theoretical model. However, in one of the samples, the indirect path from self-transcendence values to prosocial behavior was only marginally significant. Taken together, the findings point to the need for further research on the role of character strengths in creating a pathway from values to various social outcomes. (shrink)

Organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) is considered vital for organizations’ performance, and there is notable interest in factors that foster it. However, recent research has questioned the absolute positivity of OCB and pointed to its understudied possible adverse effects (e.g., on employees’ well-being). The present research aims to shed light on these issues by exploring the daily dynamics of employees’ social and emotional work lives’ interplay with their OCB. Specifically, the research focuses on teachers, whose job enables notable OCB and whose (...) performance is profoundly affected by it. Based on the literature linking work relationships and emotional experiences with OCB, we examined the interplay between teachers’ OCB and their daily perceived supervisor and colleague support, and daily positive and negative emotional experiences. Sixty teachers completed self-report questionnaires of the research variables every day for twelve workdays. Results indicated significant associations of daily supervisor support and negative emotions with increased OCB on the following day, links of daily positive emotions with decreased OCB on the following day, and associations of daily OCB with increased negative emotions on the following day. These findings point to daily processes that may underly longer-term effects of OCB (such as burnout), including a potential downward spiral of negative emotions that seem to result from OCB and reinforce it. (shrink)

Jiirgen Habermas is a radical democrat. The source of that self-designation is that his conception of democracy-what he calls "discursive democracy"-is founded on the ideal of "a self-organizing community of free and equal citizens," co- ordinating their collective affairs through their common reason. The author discusses three large challenges to this radical-democratic ideal of collective self-regulation: 1) What is the role of private autonomy in a radical-democratic view? 2) What role does reason play in collective self-regulation? 3) What relevance might (...) a radical- democratic outlook have for contemporary democracies? The author addresses these questions by considering Habermas' answers, and then presenting alternative responses to them. The alternatives are also radical-democratic in inspiration, but they draw on a richer set of normative-political ideas than Habermas wants to rely on, and are more ambitious in their hopes for democratic practice. (shrink)

The tapestry of Wilfrid Sellars’s writings is dauntingly rich in stimulus and suggestion. I shall take up here an intriguing strand of thought that was woven into one of his early papers ‘Language, Rules and Behavior’, and I shall discuss some of the issues to which it gives rise. Sellars was concerned in that paper with the procedures by which people evaluate actions as right or wrong, arguments as valid or invalid, and cognitive claims as well or ill grounded. He (...) sought to map out a true vïa media, in his treatment of such procedures, between rationalistic apriorism and what, for want of a better term then, he called ‘descriptivism’, by which he understood the claim that all meaningful concepts and problems belong to the empirical or descriptive sciences, including the sciences of human behaviour. Sellars was thus led to ask not only ‘What sort of a thing is justification?’ but also ‘How do we come to accept the rules or laws that license justifications?’ And he saw these questions as arising in relation to any dialogue in which one party seeks to justify something to another. With regard to the justification of actions he held that the intuitionism of Ross, Prichard and Ewing was reasonably faithful to the phenomenology of moral thought and experience, though he did not agree with their belief in a nonnatural quality or relation that may belong to actions over and above their empirical characteristics. With regard to the justification of predictions he held that the relevant covering laws are ultimately rendered acceptable by an appeal to instances of their application. But he was reluctant to conceive this kind of appeal as an inductive procedure. Instead he called it an application of Socratic method, since the purpose of this method is to make explicit the rules that we have implicitly adopted for thought and action, and Sellars interpreted our judgments to the effect that A causally necessitates B as the expression of a rule governing our use of the terms ‘A’ and ‘B’: science consists in the attempt, by remodeling human language, to develop a system of rule-governed behaviour which will adjust the human organism to the environment. (shrink)

I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.

In a study published in late April in Nature Communications, the authors were able to sustain 105- to 115-day-old premature lamb fetuses—whose level of development was comparable to that of a twenty-three-week-old human fetus—for four weeks in an artificial womb, enabling the lambs to develop in a way that paralleled age-matched controls. The oldest lamb of the set, more than a year old at the time the paper came out, appeared completely normal. This kind of research brings us one step (...) closer to providing excellent quality of life for premature newborns, but it also portends major legal and ethical questions, especially for abortion rights in America. (shrink)

Students of perception have long puzzled over a range of cases in which perception seems to tell us distinct, and in some sense conflicting, things about the world. In the cases at issue, the perceptual system is capable of responding to a single stimulus — say, as manifested in the ways in which subjects sort that stimulus — in different ways. This paper is about these puzzling cases, and about how they should be characterized and accounted for within a general (...) theory of perception. After rehearsing the sort of case at issue (§1), I’ll examine critically some of the strategies by which philosophers and perceptual psychologists have attempted to account for them (§2). Finally, I’ll present an alternative computational account of the puzzle cases, argue that this view is superior to its competitors, and examine some of its implications (§3). (shrink)

Feelings of guilt are human emotions that may arise if a person committed an action that contradicts basic moral mores or failed to commit an action that is considered moral according to their ethical standards and values. Psychological scholarship distinguishes between altruistic guilt (AG) and deontological guilt (DG). AG results from having caused harm to an innocent victim, either by acting or failing to act, whereas DG is caused by violating a moral principle. Although physicians may be expected to experience (...) frequent feelings of guilt in their demanding and intensive work, it is surprising to find that this issue has not been explored in the professional literature on medical ethics. To that end, we conducted a qualitative study that included personal in-depth interviews with Sunni Muslim gynaecologists. These doctors provide underground infertility care and perform religiously forbidden treatments involving sex selection and gamete donation. They opened their hearts and spoke about the emotionally taxing pangs of conscience they suffer. Analysing their narratives led us to characterize their feelings of guilt as DG. We discuss the causes for their plight and the way they cope with it, compare DG to the concept of moral distress, and call for future research on clinicians’ feelings of guilt and pangs of conscience. (shrink)